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COMMENTARY
Goliath versus Goliath in high-stakes MBS litigation
By Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss 
Brooklyn Law School
The loan-origination and mortgage-
securitization practices between 2000 and 
2007 created the housing and mortgage-
backed securities bubble that precipitated the 
2008 economic crisis and ensuing recession. 
The mess that the loan-origination and 
mortgage-securitization practices caused is 
now playing out in courts around the world.  
MBS investors are suing banks, MBS sponsors 
and underwriters for misrepresenting the 
quality of loans purportedly held in MBS 
pools and failing to properly transfer loan 
documents and mortgages to the pools, as 
required by the MBS pooling and servicing 
agreements.  State and federal prosecutors 
have also filed claims against banks, 
underwriters and sponsors for the roles they 
played in creating defective MBS and for 
misrepresenting the quality of the assets 
purportedly held in MBS pools. 
An Australian federal court ruled in favor of 
plaintiffs who sued Standard & Poor’s for 
misrepresentations it made in its ratings of 
MBS.1  The U.S. Department of Justice and 
California attorney general have since filed 
lawsuits against S&P.2   
Finally, a line of cases against insurers of the 
mortgage notes is working through the court 
system.  All of this litigation is in addition 
to litigation between banks and borrowers 
regarding the validity of mortgages and 
mortgage notes, as well as the standing 
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of banks to bring foreclosure actions or 
establish standing in bankruptcy cases. 
The lawsuits by MBS investors and 
prosecutors (upstream litigation) and 
litigation involving borrowers (downstream 
litigation) has banks, sponsors, underwriters 
and ratings agencies in a vice.  The amount 
of downstream and upstream litigation 
continues to grow.3  With downstream 
litigation cases being decided, the contours 
of the law regarding banks’ standing to 
foreclose on defaulted loans and to join 
bankruptcy proceedings of borrowers are 
beginning to emerge. 
not a comprehensive review of all the activity 
in this area, but it does provide an overview 
of the issues at stake in this litigation.  The 
litigation in this area is still relatively new, but 
with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, 
it will likely last for years to come and should 
reshape the MBS landscape.  
Even though the stakes are high for the 
litigants in this area, decisions in any of these 
cases should affect behavior and practices 
in the financial industry.  If the decisions 
deter the type of activity and practices that 
precipitated the financial crises, they will 
add stability to the financial markets and the 
The litigation in this area is still relatively new, but with 
hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, it will likely last for years 
to come and should reshape the MBS landscape.
On the other hand, the numerous upstream 
complaints filed and few published decisions 
(most regarding motions for summary 
judgment) provide just an outline of the 
claims investors and prosecutors are making 
against banks, promoters, underwriters and 
ratings agencies in upstream MBS litigation. 
This commentary focuses on the state of 
this upstream litigation.  It reviews claims 
of several complaints and discusses some 
decisions on motions for summary judgment 
in several of the cases.  The commentary is 
world economy.  Thus, the stakes are much 
higher than the significant sums directly at 
controversy in these cases.
LAWSUITS AGAINST BANKS AND 
MBS SPONSORS
Numerous lawsuits against banks and MBS 
sponsors are winding their way through 
various state and federal courts.4
The allegations in lawsuits brought by 
investors and prosecutors are similar. 
Generally, the allegations focus on 
misrepresentations sponsors made in MBS 
offering materials.  First, they say sponsors 
represented that securitized loans were 
originated in accordance with specified 
underwriting guidelines, and the sponsors 
engaged in due diligence to ensure the 
quality of the loans.  The plaintiffs allege, 
however, that in MBS pools, the sponsors 
routinely included mortgages deviating from 
the stated loan origination and underwriting 
standards.  They also allege sponsors 
knowingly securitized loans that a due 
diligence vendor deemed to be defectively 
underwritten, and they off-loaded the worse 
loans from their balance sheets.
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Second, plaintiffs claim that sponsors 
downplayed the risk of borrower default 
by presenting misleading borrower credit 
scores and overstating the number of loans 
secured by owner-occupied residences. 
Several alleged sponsor practices suggest 
that they knew loans were of poor quality 
but transferred them to the MBS trusts.  For 
example, plaintiffs say sponsors expressly 
instructed due diligence vendors not to 
verify occupancy status or credit scores 
and to make up data.  Allegedly, sponsors 
knew that originators purposefully steered 
borrowers to high-risk mortgages and 
granted loans without establishing credit 
scores.  They also allegedly securitized loans 
before the expiration of the early payment 
default period because mortgages (despite 
the likelihood of default) are not technically 
in default before that time. 
Third, complaints assert that sponsors knew 
the value of the property collateralizing 
the loans was much lower than what they 
represented in offering materials.  The 
allegations claim originators blacklisted 
appraisers who refused to inflate collateral 
values, and sponsors instructed due diligence 
vendors not to review appraisals.  They also 
claim sponsors falsely represented that loans 
with high loan-to-value ratios were restricted 
to particularly creditworthy borrowers. 
Complaints also allege that sponsors failed 
to disclose the deliberate effort to undermine 
the due diligence processes, resulting in false 
and misleading MBS ratings.  The allegations 
also say sponsors further compromised the 
integrity of the credit ratings by pressuring 
rating agencies to provide the highest ratings 
for their MBS. 
Fourth, complaints contend that executives 
aided and abetted fraud.  The allegations 
say high-level executives helped create 
policies encouraging high-risk lending 
and reduced controls to increase profits by 
creating greater numbers of MBS regardless 
of quality.  Finally, these complaints allege 
that sponsors negligently misrepresented 
information.
Defenses 
Sponsors’ primary defense to those 
allegations appears to be that they disclosed 
risks associated with purchasing MBS and that 
the downturn in the market caused the loss, 
not their wrongdoing.  Sponsors also argue 
that the plaintiffs were highly sophisticated 
financial institutions with significant 
experience in the mortgage industry, so 
their reliance on the representations in the 
offering documents was unjustified.
Status of lawsuits
Most lawsuits are still in the pre-trial phase, 
but several courts have published rulings 
on motions to dismiss.  Some early rulings 
granted the motions,5 but more recent rulings 
allow lawsuits to proceed.  For example, the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York denied the sponsor’s motion to 
dismiss a claim on all grounds.6  The court 
held that the plaintiffs alleged facts that, if 
that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged 
facts (such as the defendants pressuring 
the appraisers and rating agencies into 
increasing their evaluations) that call into 
question the factual bases for the appraisal 
and rating evaluations.  The court also found 
that the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts 
to show that the defendant had the requisite 
motive (to obtain high credit ratings to sell 
the MBS certificates), the defendants knew 
or should have known that the loans violated 
underwriting standards, and the appraisals 
did not satisfy industry standards.
Generally, the allegations focus on misrepresentations 
sponsors made in MBS offering materials.
true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level, the standard 
that applies to motions to dismiss a claim 
in federal court.7  Thus, the court denied 
the sponsor’s motion to dismiss state law 
claims of fraud, fraudulent inducement, 
aiding and abetting fraud, and negligent 
misrepresentation.  The court found that 
disclaimers in offering documents regarding 
the possibility that some loans might fail to 
satisfy the underwriting requirements were 
insufficient to put the investors on notice that 
the sponsors generally did not follow the 
underwriting guidelines. 
Offering documents also disclosed that 
some loans could not meet the definition of 
delinquent because they were transferred to 
the MBS pool before the due date of the first 
payment.  The court found that disclosure 
was not sufficient to address the sponsor’s 
policy of transferring mortgage notes before 
the early payment default period expired. 
The court determined that the language 
in fact suggested that the sponsor should 
have made a disclosure relating to the 
early payment default period.  Apparently, 
the court believes the sponsor should have 
disclosed that the notes would not fall 
within the definition of delinquent because 
insufficient time had passed to test the 
borrowers. 
Regarding the value of collateral, the 
sponsors claim that language in the offering 
materials specifically warned that the value of 
property could fluctuate, extraneous reports 
warned of possible fluctuations in property 
values and valuations of appraisers were 
merely opinions.  The court found, however, 
Finally, the court found that despite the 
plaintiff’s sophistication in financial matters, 
it had adequately alleged that no outside 
information could have led to the discovery 
of the defendants’ fraudulent practices. 
Consequently, the court denied the motion 
to dismiss.
LAWSUITS AGAINST RATING 
AGENCIES
Two lawsuits (one brought by the Department 
of Justice and the other by the California 
attorney general) in California against S&P 
illustrate the types of claims that credit 
ratings agencies face in the United States. 
The DOJ’s complaint alleges that S&P 
committed mail fraud, wire fraud and 
financial institution fraud.8  The premise 
of these allegations is that S&P presented 
itself as providing high-quality, objective, 
independent and rigorous analytical 
information to the marketplace.  Allegedly, 
however, it was financially beholden to the 
sponsors of MBS and CDO securities (a 
collateral debt obligation is an interest in 
a pool of MBS), resulting in numerous bad 
actions.  The DOJ claims that S&P ignored 
information about the underlying mortgages 
held in RMBS trusts and MBS tranches held 
by CDOs and that it intentionally failed 
to implement programs that would have 
returned more objective ratings.  
The lawsuit alleges that S&P’s desire to 
increase profit by satisfying sponsors of 
CDOs and MBS was its motive for ignoring 
information about the underlying assets 
and downplaying risk.   The DOJ relies upon 
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S&P internal communications revealing a 
particular sensitivity to demands and input 
from sponsors who wanted favorable credit 
ratings.  The DOJ said S&P lowered its criteria 
for rating CDOs of real estate assets to keep 
from losing deals. 
The DOJ also claims that S&P did not update 
the model it used to analyze MBS because 
doing so would have led to lower ratings, 
which would have caused S&P to lose 
business. Internal documents also suggest 
S&P knew that mortgage loans underlying 
many MBS were underperforming, which 
should have adversely affected ratings, but 
S&P did not adjust the ratings to account for 
such underperformance.  The complaint lists 
several CDOs that S&P rated at investment 
grade, which lost value and resulted in severe 
loss for several purchasers who fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 
1989.
Defenses
In support of its motion to dismiss, S&P 
argues first that the statements the DOJ 
relies upon cannot be the basis for a finding 
of fraud under federal law.9  Second, S&P 
argues that the complaint does not allege 
that S&P’s opinions were false and fraudulent 
due to S&P believing them at the time they 
were made.  S&P presents the internal 
communication as “robust internal debate.” 
Third, S&P argues that the complaint fails 
to allege that it had the requisite intent 
to defraud the investors of CDOs.  For 
instance, S&P argues that Citibank and Bank 
of America, which purchased CDOs, also 
created the very CDOs at issue.  S&P also 
argues that the investors did not pay the 
ratings fees, but the sponsors did. 
S&P asserts that its ratings were objective, 
independent and uninfluenced by conflicts of 
interest and that the DOJ’s claims relate to 
subjective statements that are not actionable. 
First, S&P argues that general statements it 
made about its services, integrity, credibility 
and objectivity do not support a claim of 
fraud.  Instead, S&P argues, such statements 
are non-actionable puffery.  Second, S&P 
argues that statements about its mission are 
aspirational and non-actionable statements 
that are not representations of current 
activity.  Third, S&P argues that statements 
it made regarding its policy and code of 
conduct are not actionable statements of 
objective facts.  Finally, S&P argues that 
information about its ratings processes are 
neither quantifiable nor substantive enough 
to offer any specific qualitative guidance and 
are too general to serve as a basis for a fraud 
claim.
S&P also argued that the DOJ failed to 
sufficiently plead that the credit ratings were 
objectively false or that S&P subjectively 
disbelieved them on the date of issue.  S&P 
claims that the DOJ’s failure to identify the 
true credit risk associated with any of the 
securities at issue was a failure to plead 
with sufficient particularity that the ratings 
were incorrect or misleading.  S&P also 
claims that the DOJ failed to plead with 
sufficient particularity that the ratings did 
not reflect S&P’s current opinion.  Among 
other defenses on this point, S&P argues that 
the DOJ cannot know whether S&P took into 
account updated information about RMBS 
ratings when it rated CDOs.
that the defendants knew of facts or had 
access to information that contradicted their 
statements. 
The court also concluded that the statements 
the plaintiffs claimed were misleading 
were not material because they would not 
alter the decision to invest in the McGraw-
Hill stock.  The court took issue with the 
complaint because it consisted of large block 
quotations and italicized text with claims that 
statements in the text were materially false 
and misleading.  The court held that such a 
presentation of material does not state with 
specificity how each statement is materially 
false or misleading.  These findings led the 
court to dismiss the shareholder suit against 
S&P.
The complaints filed by the DOJ and California 
attorney general are distinguishable from this 
2nd Circuit case as the DOJ and California 
cases are not securities fraud cases brought 
by S&P shareholders.  It will be interesting to 
see if the courts in California reach a different 
result based upon different legal theories.
LAWSUITS BY MONOLINE INSURERS 
AGAINST SPONSORS
Monoline insurers evaluate the likelihood 
that an MBS trust will default on any of its 
obligations.  They then acquire sufficient 
comfort from the sponsor and the strength 
of the collateral that the risk of default is 
manageable, given the premium they charge 
for the insurance.  Monoline insurers, who 
effectively ensure that investors in MBS 
receive payments in a timely manner, have 
brought lawsuits against the MBS sponsors, 
claiming the sponsors committed fraud or 
made misrepresentations regarding the 
quality of mortgages underlying the MBS.  
In one typical case (the EMC case), monoline 
insurer Assured Guaranty Corp. alleged 
“that Bear Stearns grossly misrepresented 
the risk of the underlying pooled loans” 
used as collateral in MBS deals that it 
had underwritten.11  Assured alleged that 
loan warranties in nearly 90 percent of the 
loans in one of the pools at issue had been 
breached.  As a result, Assured claimed that 
the defendants breached the representations 
and warranties and the agreement.  The New 
York trial court said that more than half of 
the loans in that pool had either “defaulted 
or are seriously delinquent.”  Bear Stearns’ 
successor-in-interest refused to re-purchase 
the breaching loans as required by their 
agreement.
Disclaimers in offering 
documents regarding the 
possibility that some loans 
might fail to satisfy the 
underwriting requirements 
were insufficient to put the 
investors on notice.
Status of lawsuits
The DOJ suit awaits the court’s ruling on 
S&P’s motion for summary judgment, but 
other courts have acted on other motions to 
dismiss in securities fraud suits against S&P. 
For example, the 2nd Circuit upheld the 
dismissal of a securities fraud lawsuit against 
S&P executives because the complaint failed 
to state a claim with sufficient particularity.10 
The plaintiff shareholders in that case sued 
McGraw-Hill Cos (S&P’s parent company), 
and two of its corporate officers for making 
false and misleading statements about 
the operations of S&P.  The court held 
that statements about S&P’s integrity, 
transparency and independence were puffery 
and did not support a securities fraud claim. 
The court also held that claims about S&P’s 
surveillance practices did not come within the 
definition of misleading, and S&P’s failure to 
disclose that accurately reported earnings 
were unsustainable is not securities fraud. 
The court also found that the plaintiffs had 
not presented facts supporting the inference 
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In another typical case (the Flagstar 
case), Assured Guaranty Municipal Cor., 
another Assured subsidiary, alleged “that 
the loans underlying the securities were 
either materially fraudulent or were the 
product of material underwriting defects, in 
breach of Flagstar’s [the sponsor’s] express 
representations and warranties.”12  Assured 
thus argued that it was “entitled to be 
reimbursed for its payment of insurance 
claims that arose when many of the 
underlying loans defaulted,” and Flagstar 
thereafter “refused to cure the defects or 
substitute eligible loans.”
Defenses
Sponsors argue that they have 
materially complied with the contractual 
representations and warranties as well as 
the sponsor “was made aware of Assured’s 
claim of pervasive and material breaches 
of the representations and warranties and, 
therefore, had breached its contract with 
Assured by failing to ‘re-purchase or cure’ the 
materially defective loans,” as required by the 
agreement between the parties.  Flagstar has 
since settled the case for over $100 million.
In light of these cases, monoline insurers 
are expected to change deal documents 
going forward.  Most likely, they will not 
be so willing to treat representations and 
warranties as mere risk allocation devices 
between the parties.  As risk allocation 
devices, the representations and warranties 
typically make only limited remedies 
available.  Monoline insurers may demand 
they be treated as something more- perhaps 
as actual representations and warranties 
about the underlying transaction that, if 
breached, could lead to an unwinding of the 
insurance policy.
CONCLUSION
The MBS upstream litigation is in its infancy. 
Claims that prosecutors and plaintiffs 
make are very serious.  If banks, sponsors, 
underwriters, appraisers and credit rating 
agencies committed the purported wrongs, 
the world was duped and has paid a 
significant price for their wrongdoing.  Many 
of the cases will likely settle without a full 
vetting of facts.  If a few make it to trial, 
full discovery will help publicize important 
facts from the era preceding the financial 
crisis.  Those facts can help elucidate bad 
behavior and perhaps point to a better way of 
monitoring large financial transactions.  The 
decisions from courts can help discourage 
such behavior in the future.
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